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SEX DISCRIMINATION IN WELFARE
LEGISLATION
THEODORE GUBERMAN*
Welfare legislation' in this country has generally sought two results-
to assist and to improve the recipient. The needy, it would seem, are
especially dear to social engineers. Thus society has at one time or
another conditioned its benevolence upon good moral behavior,' or
upon demonstrations of willingness to help oneself,3 or upon conformity
to traditional family structures and sex roles. 4 This last condition, based
on the presumption that men are breadwinners and women homemak-
ers, continues to deny benefits to large numbers of people who do not
conform to these stereotypes. 5 Under the federal Social Security Act
some benefits provided to male workers and their wives are denied
entirely to female workers and their husbands or are provided only if the
* B.A., Harvard College, 1962; M.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1969;
J.D., Washington University, 1976.
1. "Welfare legislation" is used throughout this Note to mean governmental pro-
grams which provide cash payments to individuals to mitigate the hardships of poverty,
old age, disability, and unemployment.
2. See note 126 infra.
3. See note 126 infra.
4. See notes 86-90 and accompanying text infra.
5. Women especially do not seem to conform to the homemaker stereotype. In May
1973, 51.5% of women aged 20 to 64 were in the work force; 53.9% of women aged 18 to 19
were in the work force. 19 EMPLOYMENT & EARNINcS 24 (1973). In 1971, 59% of women
workers were married, and one-third had dependent children. 95 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 9
(1972). In 1970, working wives provided the major source of income for 3.2 million
families, 7.4% of the total of 44 million two-parent families. U.S. BUREAU OFTHE CENSUs,
SOURCES AND STRUCTURE OF FAMILY INCOME 377 (1973). In 1972, about 15 million
households were supported by women; 6.1 million families were headed by women; 8.7
million women were heads of households with no other relatives present. U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 1972, CURRENT POPULA-
TON REPORTS, Series P-20, No. 246 (February 1973), Table C. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT 34-5 (1971); Note, Sex Classifications in the Social Security
Benefit Structure, 49 IND. L.J. 181-84 (1973).
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
husbands are dependent.6 There is a difference, too, in the method of
computing benefits for some retired male and female workers.7 And
some states, under Aid to Families with Dependent Children, provide
benefits to families with unemployed fathers but not to families with
unemployed mothers. 8 Tradition and policy go hand in hand here:
benefits based upon sex are intended to aid those who have traditionally
assumed economically dependent roles, and at the same time, they
reinforce these roles. 9 Many of these laws which treat welfare recipients
differently solely on the basis of their sex now seem ready to fall to a
well-founded equal protection attack.'0
I. SEX DISCRIMINATION AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Traditionally, the courts have applied two standards of review to
statutory classifications challenged on equal protection grounds. Under
the more lenient "rational relationship" standard, the courts permit
classifications rationally related to the purpose of the statute." The
classification is presumed valid; the plaintiff must bear the burden of
proving it arbitrary and irrational. 12 Under the "strict scrutiny" stan-
dard, the courts require the government to show a "compelling inter-
est" for the classification and the absence of a reasonable alternative for
6. See notes 86-90 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 113-125 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 126-134 and accompanying text infra.
9. See generally CITIZENS' ADvISORY COUNCIL ONTHE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON SOCIAL INSURANCE AND TAXES (1968); HEW, REPORT OF THE
WOMEN'S ACTION PROGRAM 85-93 (1972); NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, NOW
GOALS (1973); THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF TIlE
COMM. ON SOCIAL INSURANCE AND TAXES (1963).
10. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "No state
shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The
federal government is similarly constrained by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. "[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does
forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.' "
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,680 n.5 (1973). The "[Supreme] Court's approach
to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to
equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." Weinbergee v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636,638 n.2 (1975). See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Jimenez
v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42
(1969); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499
(1954).
11. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,546(1972); Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960).
12. Under this test "[a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
426 (1961). The presumptive validity of legislative classifications is seen as essential to the
legislative process. Id. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1948).
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SEX DISCRIMINATION
accomplishing its purpose. 13 This standard is applied to certain "sus-
pect" classifications, those based upon race, 14 alienage, 5 and national
origin, 16 and to classifications affecting "fundamental rights. '"17
Until quite recently the Supreme Court of the United States consist-
ently applied the rational relationship test to sex-based classifications.18
And because the Court viewed women "as the center of home and
family life,"' 19 it never lacked a "rational" basis for differences in the
rights granted to men and women. Whatever else might be said of this
approach, it was precise and predictable. In 1971, however, the Court
began to change this trend of decision by unanimously striking down, in
13. See note 35 infra. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). See also Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968
Term-Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 7, 20 (1969).
14. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,681 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
15. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,681 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
16. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 681 (1973); Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
17. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel interstate); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
18. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (upholding statute forbidding a
woman who was not the wife or daughter of the tavern owner from serving as a bartender
while permitting any woman to serve as cocktail waitress in the same establishment; the
Court justified the classification as preventing "moral and social problems" that might
arise if women were bartenders); Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir.
1971), vacated and remanded, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
19. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57,62 (1961). SeeFrontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
684-85 (1973).
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of
the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong,
or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman
adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband.
' * * The paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring), quotedin
411 U.S. at 684-85. See also State v. Hunter, 208 Ore. 282, 300 P.2d 455 (1956) (state may
prohibit professional wrestling by women); Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230 (1959) (state may prohibit women from attending
branch of state university). But see Karczewski v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 274 F. Supp. 169
(N.D. I1. 1967) (state has no rational basis for allowing men but not women to recover for
loss of consortium).
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Reed v. Reed,20 an Idaho statute2' preferring the appointment of men to
women in the administration of decedents' estates. The statute wholly
ignored the relative capabilities of male and female applicants for
executorships. 22 While admitting "some legitimacy" to the state's
objective of reducing the workload of the probate court by resolving
without a hearing the competing claims of some male and female
applicants,2 the Court held that the sex-based classification did not
have "a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.''24
Although the state argued that men are generally more conversant with
business affairs than women,25 the Court gave no consideration to, and
hence implicitly rejected, any such notion.
The difficulty in interpreting Reed is to decide-whether tfie Court
failed the statute under the rational relationship test or applied some
new test intermediate to rational relationship and strict scrutiny. 26 On
20. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
21. IDAHO CODE §§ 15-312, 15-314 (1948). The statutes established classes of persons
entitled to administer decedents' estates and the order of the classes. Within each class,
men were preferred over women. A woman could be granted letters of administration in
preference to a man in a lower class. In Reed the competing male and female applicants
were the parents of the decedent and in the same class. 404 U.S. at 72-75.
22. 404 U.S. at 74.
23. Id. at 76.
24. Id.
25. Brief for Respondent at 12, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Idaho Supreme
Court had suggested that the state legislature might reasonably have "concluded that in
general men are betterqualified to act as an administrator than are women." Reed v. Reed,
93 Idaho 511, 514, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (1970).
26. An intermediate equal protection test seems to have been employed in Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (invalidating Louisiana workmen's
compensation statute providing different treatment in recovery for legitimate and illegiti-
mate children of injured workers), and in Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477
F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) (invalidating athletic conference regulation prohibiting women
from participating in interscholastic sports).See Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2646 (1976) (invalidating enactment which sets weight requirements
for police officers as discriminatory to women while allowing height requirements);
Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 1973); Wark v. Robbins, 458 F.2d 1295,
1297 n.4 (1st Cir. 1972). Compare Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir.
1973) (invalidating forced maternity leave statute under "substantial rationality test"),
with Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 414
U.S. 632 (1974) (consolidated with Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur) (upholding forced
maternity leave statute under traditional rational basis analysis). This new test, which the
Supreme Court has never acknowledged, has been described as "means-focused"
scrutiny, demanding that the classification actually further the statutory goal. Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 20 (1972). See also
Getman, The Emerging Constitutional Principle of Sexual Equality, 1972 Sup. CT. Rev.
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the one hand, the Court purported to decide "whether a difference in the
sex of competing applicants. . . bears a rational relationship to a state
objective" 27 advanced by the statute, and it admitted that the state's
interest in administrative convenience is "not without some legiti-
macy." 28 But on the other hand, the Court declared that this sex-based
classification is an "arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Con-
stitution]" and that such classifications generally must bear not merely a
rational, but a "fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation.' '29
If the meaning of Reed is not altogether clear, the unanimity displayed
by the Court was thoroughly shattered by its next encounter with sex
discrimination. In Frontiero v. Richardson30 the Court struck down
under the due process clause of the fifth amendment3' federal statutes
providing certain benefits to servicemen and their wives, regardless of
dependency, but requiring servicewomen, in order to get the same
benefits, to prove their husbands actually dependent upon them for
more than one-half of their support. 2 Here, too, the government argued
that the sex-based classification was rationally related to administrative
convenience-that it would save effort and expense in the long run to
presume that all wives are dependent, rather than determine case by
case those wives who are not, and to determine case by case those
husbands who are dependent, rather than to presume that all husbands
are)
Four justices, 4 in a plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan,
urged that classifications based solely upon sex be declared "inherently
157 (1973); Ginsberg, Comment on Reed v. Reed, I WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 6 (1972);
Sedler, The Legal Dimensions of Women's Liberation: An Overview, 47 IND. L.J. 419
(1972): 27 VAND. L. REV. 551, 553-54 (1974); 1972 Wis. L. REV. 626.
27. 404 U.S. at 76.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
31. Id. at 688, 691. See note 10 supra.
32. 411 U.S. at 678. The benefits sought by the female plaintiff and provided to her
male counterparts under 37 U.S.C. §§ 401,403 (1970) and 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076 (1970)
were medical and dental care for her dependents and increased housing allowances for
herself and her family. "[Tlhe legislative history of these statutes sheds virtually no light
on the purposes underlying the differential treatment accorded to male and female
members .... .- 411 U.S. at 681 & n.6.
33. 411 U.S. at 681, 688-89. The district court had been persuaded by this argument,
because approximately 99% of all members of the uniformed services are male. 341 F.
Supp. 201, 207 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
34 Justice% Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall.
19761
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suspect" and subject not merely to the rational relationship test but
instead to "strict scrutiny." 35 In order to satisfy the demands of strict
scrutiny, the government, Justice Brennan said, would have had to
show that it was cheaper to grant the benefits to all male servicemen
than to identify those servicemen with dependent wives and grant the
benefits only to them. This showing the government had failed to make,
and the Court doubted that it could be made.36 Then Justice Brennan
went on to propose a new per se rule: "[A]ny statutory scheme which
draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving
administrative convenience, necessarily commands 'dissimilar treat-
ment for men and women who are. . . similarly situated,' and therefore
involves the 'very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
[Constitution] . . . . 37 Administrative convenience combined with
some other interest apparently would satisfy the stricter standard of
review, but Justice Brennan gave no hint as to the nature of a satisfac-
tory combination interest. 38 At the least, the plurality justices seem to
have gone well beyond Reed, yet they professed to find "at least implicit
support" 39 for their view in the earlier case. Justice Brennan argued that
in rejecting the "apparently rational explanation" for the statutory
35. 411 U.S. at 688. "[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition 'of special
disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to
violate 'the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship
to individual responsibility' . . . . And what differentiates sex from such non-suspect
statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect
criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society." Id. at 686. For lower court cases applying strict scrutiny to
sex-based classifications, see Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School Dist., 371 F.
Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 820
(1975); Ballard v. Laird, 360 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. Cal. 1973); United States exrel. Robinson
v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1,485 P.2d
529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971); State v. Costello, 59 N.J. 334, 282 A.2d 748 (1971).
36. 411 U.S. at 689-90.
37. Id. at 690.
38. It is difficult to believe that the Court would accept, in combination with adminis-
trative convenience, an interest which was not itself compelling enough to pass the strict
scrutiny test. Surely, the Court would not do so if the suspect category were, say, race.
Should the plurality view prevail and sex become a suspect category, it may be that the
Court will not view it as quite so suspect as the other categories. There may be a suggestion
here that the Court would give the Equal Rights Amendment, should it be ratified,
something less than its strongest possible effect. Some proponents of ERA argue that the
amendment would make sex not merely a suspect classification, but an altogether
prohibited classification. See Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871,
889-91 (1971).
39. 411 U.S. at 682.
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scheme in Reed, the Court did not merely find the explanation insuffi-
ciently rational but turned away from the rational relationship analysis
of sex-based classifications.'
Of the five remaining justices, three concurred4' in the judgment of
the plurality on the authority of Reed, but expressly declined to elevate
sex to a suspect category.4 2 The three justices thought that as the Equal
Rights Amendment had been approved by Congress and submitted to
the states, the Court should not pre-empt the ratification procedure by
imposing strict judicial scrutiny upon sex-based classifications. 43
Another justice took an intermediate position; also citing Reed, he
concurred on the ground that the statute worked "an invidious discrimi-
nation in violation of the Constitution." 44
A year later, in Kahn v. Shevin,45 the Court, in a six-to-three decision,
upheld a Florida statute46 granting a $500 property tax exemption to
widows but not to widowers. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas
quoted Reed, "There can be no doubt . . . that Florida's differing
treatment of widows and widowers 'rest[s] upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation.' "'47 The ground of difference, it was argued, was the greater
economic loss to widows than to widowers on the death of their
spouses.' Justice Douglas, curiously, had stood with the Frontiero
plurality in urging that strict scrutiny be applied to sex-based classifica-
tions, and the plurality had argued that Reed authorized this stand and
rejected the rational relationship test.49 But here Justice Douglas
returned to the Reed version of the test, calling for a "fair and substan-
tial relation" between the classification and the object of the legislation,
40. Id. at 683-84.
41. Justices Powell, Burger. and Blackmun.
42. 411 U.S. at 691-92.
43. Id. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment provides that "equality of rights shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." H.R.J.
Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
44, 411 U.S. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring).
45. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
46. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.202 (Supp. 1976-77). A property tax exemption for widows
had been incorporated into the state constitution at least as far back as 1885. 416 U.S. at
352.
47. 416 U.S. at 355.
48. Id. at 354. "In 1970 while 40% of males in the work force earned over $10,000, and
70% over $7,000, 45% of women working full time earned less than $5,000, and 73.9%
earned less than $7,000." Id. at 353 n.4.
49. See notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
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in order to uphold the different treatment of the sexes. The difference
between Frontiero and Kahn, Justice Douglas proposed, is that the
statute in Frontiero denied benefits to servicewomen and their hus-
bands, unless the latter were dependent, "solely for administrative
convenience" whereas the statute in Kahn sought to remedy the effect
of past economic discrimination against women by "cushioning the
financial impact of spousal loss." 5 An equally important distinction for
Justice Douglas-but perhaps only a makeweight explanation for his
apparent defection from the Frontiero plurality-is that Kahn deals
with a state tax law:
We have long held that '[w]here taxation is concerned and no
specific federal right, apart from equal protection is imperiled, the
States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines
which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation.'5I
Whether or not Kahn will be expressly limited to sex-based classifica-
tions in tax law remains to be seen. At this point, Justice Douglas's
attempts to distinguish Frontiero and Kahn seem at least partly
designed to avoid controversy among the justices over the proper
standard of equal protection for the sexes.
The three other justices of the Frontiero plurality dissented. 52 Two
believed that the purpose of remedying past economic discrimination
against women satisfied the compelling interest requirement of the strict
scrutiny test, 53 but all three believed that the state had not met the
burden under the test of showing that this purpose could not have been
achieved by a narrower statute, one which did not grant the exemption
to wealthy widows while denying it to needy widowers. 54
The conceptual difficulties with Kahn are large. First, the Court again
failed to clarify the standard to be applied to statutory classifications
based on sex. Second, the scope of the opinion, whether or not it will be
applied in contexts other than taxation, is uncertain. Third, the reasons
why taxation differs from other contexts in respect to the demands and
standards of equal protection were not explained. And fourth, the tax
exemption for widows does in fact discriminate against women in much
50. 416 U.S. at 355.
51. Id.
52. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White.
53. Justices Brennan and Marshall. 416 U.S. at 357-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 357-58, 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 361 (White J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan pointed out that the statute could be narrowed by excluding widows above a
certain income. This change could easily be effected since widows must complete an
application form prepared by the state in order to get the exemption. See note 13 and
accompany text supra.
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the same way as the statute struck down in Frontiero. It presumes that
married women do not provide valuable economic support for their
husbands, and it places their surviving husbands in a weaker economic
position than the surviving wives of married men. In order to leave their
families in the same economic position as those which lose husbands
and fathers, married women must provide an additional source of
income for them after they die. And it is wholly irrational to presume
that married women are less concerned than married men about their
estates and the protection of their families.
Next, the Court, in Geduldig v. Aiello,55 upheld California's disability
insurance plan, which provides benefits for unemployment resulting
from injury or illness but not from normal pregnancy and childbirth.56
All employees are required to contribute to the plan one per cent of their
wages, to a maximum of $85, unless they participate in a private
insurance plan approved by the state.57 The plan does provide unemp-
loyment benefits in cases of abnormal pregnancy and childbirth.58 In
upholding the plan, the Court declared that the equal protection stand-
ard in welfare classifications is whether or not the line drawn is
"rationally supportable." 59 The state, said the Court, has a legitimate
interest in maintaining the employee contribution level at one per cent of
earnings, and it could not do so if benefits were provided for normal
pregnancy and childbirth.6 And besides, the majority insisted, the
pregnancy exclusion is not a sex-based classification:
55. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
56. CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE § 2626 (Deering 1971). See Clark v. California Employment
Stabilization Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 2d 326, 332 P.2d 716 (1958).
57. CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE §§ 984, 985, 2901,3251-54 (Deering 1971). As of 1971, four
states did include pregnancy-related disabilities in their insurance plans. Walker, Sex
Discrimination in Government Benefit Programs, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 277, 285 (1971).
Thirty-one states exclude pregnancy from coverage. Some 15 states deny unemployment
compensation benefits to workers who leave jobs to marry, to accompany spouses to
another location, or to fulfill domestic or familial obligations. Those who lose benefits for
these masons are more often than not women. At the same time, the husband usually has a
statutory right to choose the family domicile. The wife who refuses to accompany her
husband to a new location may become a deserter under the state's divorce statutes. In the
II states which provide dependents' allowances to unemployed workers, the worker may
obtain them only for relatives who are wholly or partially dependent upon the worker.
Since women's wages are lower than men's, the husband is seldom dependent on the wife,
and hence the dependent's allowance is almost never paid when the wife is unemployed.
49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 534, 538-40 (1974).
58. CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE § 2626.2 (Deering Supp. 1975). See Rentzer v. Unemploy-
ment Ins. Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 604, 108 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1973).
59. 417 U.S. at 495.
60. Id. at 496. See also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
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The California insurance plan does not exclude anyone from
benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physi-
cal condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable dis-
abilities. While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it
does not follow that every legislative classification concerning
pregnancy is a sex-based classification. . . .Normal pregnancy is
an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique charac-
teristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy
are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination
against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are
constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the
coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as
with respect to any other physical condition.
.. . The program divides potential recipients into two
groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. 61
Three justices dissented, arguing once again that Reed and Frontiero
require the strict scrutiny of sex-based classifications. 62
Geduldig, too, is not altogether persuasive. Few courts, if any, have
ever doubted that pregnancy is a sex-based classification. 63 While all
women are not pregnant at all times, all have virtually the same
reproductive biology. To seize upon biological differences between the
sexes is merely to classify by sex under another name. 64 California
requires all women to forego pregnancy and childbirth in order to
61. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
62. Id. at 503 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. The distinguishing factor seems to be motherhood versus fatherhood. The
question then arises: Is this sex-related? To the simple query the answer is just as
simple: Nobody-and this includes Judges, Solomonic or life tenured-has ever seen
a male mother. A mother to oversimplify the simplest biology, must then be a woman.
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1259 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown, C.J.,
dissenting from a denial of rehearing en banc), vacated and remandedpercuriam, 400 U.S.
542 (1971). SeeGilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367,381 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd,
519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 822 (1975); 3 HoFsrRA L. REV. 141, 142
(1975).
64. In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), the Court upheld a claim
of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against an employer
with a policy of not hiring women with pre-school children but with 75 to 80% women in a
certain position. The Court found this practice to be discriminatory because the employer
had no policy against hiring men with pre-school children. Id. at 544. The discrimination
was not in fact based on sex; the employer did not discriminate against women, only
against women with pre-school children. That is, the Court could have analyzed the
classification as women with pre-school children and persons without pre-school children,
It is this kind of reasoning which the Court approved in Geduldig. See also Moritz v.
Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973), in which
the court invalidated a tax exemption available to women and married men, but not to
unmarried men, for the care of dependents. The court could have analyzed this classifica-
tion as unmarried men and all other persons, according to the method in Geduldig, but the
court did not do so, finding instead the classification sex-based and unconstitutional.
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participate on equal terms with men in the marketplace. At the same
time, the state does provide unemployment compensation both for
elective medical procedures (cosmetic surgery, orthodontia, steriliza-
tion) and for male-only conditions and procedures (hemophilia, gout,
prostatectomy, circumcision). 61 Pregnancy, therefore, can hardly be
excluded as an "elective" or as a female-only condition. 6 Further, most
private employers are forbidden by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196467 and by the guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission 6s from treating pregnancy and childbirth differently from
other temporary disabilities, yet the Court permitted California to do
this very thing.69 At present, pregnancy is a sex-based classification
under the Civil Rights Act, while under the equal protection clause it is
not.7° Moreover, the Court seems to have misapplied the rational
relationship test. The purpose of the legislation is to compensate for
wages lost through illness or injury 71 In effect, the Court argued that to
65. 417 U.S. at 499-500 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. No benefits are payable for disabilities of fewer than eight days unless the
employee is hospitalized, in which case benefits are payable from the first day of
hospitalization. CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE §§ 2627(b), 2802 (Deering 1971). Childbirth in the
hospital, therefore, would not be excluded under the eight-day limitation.
67. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in part,
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer. . . to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1970).
Sex discrimination cases involving pregnant women have arisen most frequently in two
situations; either an employer has required an employee to take a leave of absence at a
prescribed stage of pregnancy, see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974); Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1973); Green v. Board of
Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973); Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32
(5th Cir. 1972); Heath v. Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972), or the
employer (as did the state in Geduldig) has denied sick leave and disability benefits to
pregnant employees, see Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 381 (E.D. Va.
1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 822 (1975). See generally9U.
RICHMOND L. REV. 149, 154 (1974).
68. The guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which
enforces Title VII, specifically prohibit employers from treating pregnancy and childbirth
differently from other temporary disabilities for all job-related purposes. 29 C.F.R. §
1604. 10(b) (1975). While these guidelines do not have the force of law, the courts give them
"great deference." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
69. 417 U.S. at 501-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. In treating pregnancy as a non-sex-based classification, the Court may have
cleared the way for similar treatment under § 2000e in the context of employment. See3
HoFSTA L. REV. 141 (1975). In general, the Court's approach to discrimination under
Title VII has been rather different from and more liberal than the equal protection analysis
of Geduldig. See note 64 supra.
71. The purpose of the program, as the majority pointed out by citing the state supreme
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deny unemployment compensation for pregnancy and childbirth is
rationally related to the purpose of providing unemployment compensa-
tion. The exclusion is rationally related to maintaining the regressive
contribution scheme at one per cent of earnings, but that is not the
purpose of the legislation.' Nor is it clear why the administrative cost of
benefit programs will not justify different treatment of the sexes, but the
substantive costs of the benefits themselves will. Saving money, it
would seem, is no more legitimate an interest in the one case than in the
other. Indeed, if saving money were a legitimate reason for discriminat-
ing against classes of citizens, the states could almost always deny equal
protection.
Finally, in Stanton v. Stanton7 3 the Court held that a Utah statute 74
fixing the age of majority for females at 18 years and for males at 21
years denied equal protection in requiring parents to support minor male
children for a longer period than minor female children.75 There was no
legislative history to explain this different treatment. Rejecting "old
court, is -to provide an insurance program to pay benefits to individuals who are
unemployed because of illness or injury .. " 417 U.S. at 492 n.16, citing Garcia v.
Industrial Comm'n, 41 Cal. 2d 689, 692, 263 P.2d 8, 10 (1953). The Code itself declares:
The purpose of this part is to compensate in part for the wage loss sustained by
individuals unEmployed because of sickness or injury and to reduce to a minimum the
suffering caused by unemployment resulting therefrom. This part shall be construed
liberally in aid of its declared purpose to mitigate the evils and burdens which fall on
the unemployed and disabled worker and his family.
CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE, § 2601 (Deering Supp. 1975).
72. The Court's solicitude for the low-income wage-earner who would bear a dispro-
portionately heavy share of any increase in the regressive one per cent contribution
ignores the fact that a disproportionately large number of these wage-earners are women,
many of whom may be expected to bear children, and their husbands, who would share in
the loss of family income resulting from the unemployment of their pregnant wives.
"Nearly two-thirds of all women who work do so of necessity: either they are unmarried
or their husbands earn less than $7,000 per year." 417 U.S. at 501 n.5 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The Court also argued that because women contribute 28% of the disability
fund and receive 38% of the fund in benefits, women are not discriminated against in
"aggregate risk protection." Id. at 496-97 & n.21. This argument, too, ignores the effect of
wage and job discrimination against women, which reduces the amount of their income
and hence of their contribution in relation to that of men. See table, note 86 infra.
73. 421 U.S. 7 (1974).
74. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (1953). Both males and females attain majority at an
earlier age by marriage. Utah and Arkansas are the only states which fix the age of
majority at 18 for females and at 21 for males. 421 U.S. at 15.
75. The Court did not disturb other applications of the age-of-majority statute, as for
example, the right of a minor to disaffirm contracts, the requirement of a guardian or
guardian ad litem to appear in court on behalf of a minor, the parent's right of action for
injury to a minor child, and the incompetency of a minor to serve as administrator of a
decedent's estate or as executor of a will. 421 U.S. at 17. In these situations the age of
majority remains at 18 for females and at 21 for males.
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notions" "that it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home
and that it is salutary for him to have education and training before he
assumes that responsibility; that girls tend to mature earlier than boys;
and that females tend to marry earlier than males," 76 the Court found
"nothing rational' 77 in the different classification of the sexes and
condemned generally the sex-role stereotyping of women:
No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing
of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world
of ideas. . . . The presence of women in business, in the profes-
sions, in government and, indeed, in all walks of life where educa-
tion is a desirable, if not always a necessary, antecedent is apparent
and a proper subject of judicial notice.78
Reed was "controlling," said the Court, which once again cited the
requirement of "a fair and substantial relation" between the classifica-
tion and the object of the legislation. 79 In stating the test in terms of the
case, the Court implied that minimum rationality would not justify the
sex-based classification: "The test here, then, is whether the difference
in sex between children warrants the distinction in the. . . obligation to
support that is drawn by the Utah statute. '"I In other words, different
treatment of the sexes in some situations may not be irrational, but it
may be unwarranted, and therefore prohibited by the equal protection
clause. The Court remanded to the state courts the question of whether
the age of majority for the purpose of child support should be 18 or 21
years for both sexes.8 '
Notwithstanding the obfuscation and ingenuousness of the Court's
approach to sex-based classifications,' these cases contain some
76. 421 U.S. at 14. On the basis of these "old notions" the state supreme court had
upheld the statute as applied to the obligation of child support. Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah
2d 315, 318-19, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1974).
77. 421 U.S. at 14.
78. Id. at 14-15.
79. Id. at 13-14.
80. Id. at 14.
81. Id. at 18.
82. In a rather surprising move the Supreme Court, in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), applied the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
to overturn an Ohio statute requiring mandatory maternity leave for school teachers. The
irrebutable presumption of incapacitation resulting from pregnancy was found to violate
due process by burdening the right to procreate. Three justices argued that the proper
issue was equal protection, as it had been in the lower courts. The Court had used the due
process rationale to overturn irrebutable presumptions in the past. See United States Dep't
of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.441 (1973); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Carrington v. Rush,
380 U.S. 89 (1965). But its use here seems at least partly an attempt to avoid an equal
protection analysis which might raise further questions about equal protection standards.
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important lessons. The standard for testing these classifications varies
between traditional rational relationship and fair and substantial rela-
tionship, although the Court has never openly acknowledged the exist-
ence of this latter standard. The former and weaker of the two is more
likely to be applied to sex-based classifications in welfare laws.
Administrative convenience alone will not justify such a classification,
but in combination with some other governmental interest, it may. The
substantive cost of benefits, as distinguished from the administrative
cost of determining who is entitled to them, will justify a sex-based
classification. The Court will permit different treatment of the sexes
designed to remedy past economic discrimination against women.8 3
Finally, the Court may well decide that some sex-based classifications,
like pregnancy and childbirth, are not sex-based after all.
II. SEX DISCRIMINATION AND WELFARE LEGISLATION
A. Social Security Family Benefits
One of the major public assistance programs, in terms of the number
of recipients and the sums disbursed, 84 is the federal Social Security
Act,85 which provides old age, death, and disability benefits to workers 6
That is, it might not be possible to reach the same result in LaFleur under the rational
relationship test or even under an intermediate test, which the Court has not as yet
acknolwedged. If the Court missed an opportunity to clarify its equal protection approach,
it also provided a new weapon for the attack on irrebutable, sex-based presumptions of the
kind found in the Social Security Act. See generally Note, Equal Protection and the
Pregnancy Leave Case, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 628 (1973); Note, LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of
Education: An UnarticulatedApplication of the NewApproach to Equal Protection, 35 U.
PrIr. L. REv. 141 (1973); 28 ARK. L. REV. 150 (1974); 22 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 172 (1973); 51
N.C.L. REv. 768 (1973); 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1026 (1973).
83. In Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), the Supreme Court upheld against an
equal protection challenge federal statutes subjecting male naval officers to mandatory
discharge when twice passed over for promotion while permitting female naval officers 13
years of commissioned service before subjecting them to discharge. The Court reasoned
that male and female officers are not similarly situated, since female officers do not serve
on the lines and have fewer opportunities for promotion. Congress could reasonably have
concluded, said the Court, that the 13-year period for female officers is necessary to
provide them with equivalent career opportunities to male officers. The Court, then,
seems inclined to permit different treatment of the sexes which not only remedies prior
economic discrimination against women but also remedies present economic inequalities
of some kinds.
84. By July 1973, monthly benefit payments totalled $4.1 billion. The Act now covers
90% of all workers in paid employment. The Act does not cover federal civilian em-
ployees, some state and local government employees, voluntarily excluded self-employed
farmers, and workers with income below the covered amount (see note 86 infra). 36 Soc.
SEC. BULL. No. I1, 1 (1973). See Note, Sex Classifications in the Social Security Benefit
Structure, supra note 5, at 181 n.2, 182 n.5.
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-29 (1970).
86. Benefits are based upon "quarters of coverage," three-month periods in which the
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in covered employment and to members of their families. The family
benefit provisions are structured on the basis of sex; benefits provided
to the widows,87 wives,8s wives with children, 89 and divorced wives9° of
individual worker received at least $50 in wages in employment covered by the Act or at
least $100 in self-employed income. To be "fully insured," the worker must have at least
one quarter of coverage per year from age 21 (or from 1950, whichever is later) until the
worker dies or reaches the age of 62, a total of 40 quarters. The extent of coverage is the
worker's "Primary Insurance Amount" (PIA), upon which benefits for the worker and his
family are based. 42 U.S.C. §§ 413(a), 414(a), 415(a) (1970).
Much criticism has been directed at the regressive contribution structure, under which
all employees pay what is essentially a tax on the same fixed amount of income. The
current amount subject to the contribution "tax" is $15,300. For those who earn this
amount or less for the year, the tax is relatively more burdensome than for those who earn
more. Women as a group earn less than men, as shown in the following table:
Women's median
Median Earnings earnings as
Year Women Men percent of men's
1972 $5,903 $10,202 57.9
1971 5,593 9,399 59.5
1970 5,323 8,966 59.4
1969 4,977 8,227 60.5
1968 4,457 7,664 58.2-
1967 4,150 7,182 57.8
1966 3,973 6,848 58.0
1965 3,823 6,375 60.0
1964 3,690 6,195 59.6
1963 3,561 5,978 59.6
Prepared by Women's Bureau, Employment Standards Administration, U.S. Dep't of
Labor, from data published by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, cited
in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353-54 n.5 (1974). The table cited also includes statistics
for the years 1955-62. The tax, therefore, falls more heavily upon women than upon men.
In 1971, for example, the tax was imposed on the first $7,800 of earnings. Fifty-five per
cent of all male workers, compared with 91% of all female workers, earned less than
$8,000 for the year. While benefits are weighted in favor of low-income workers, each
category of benefits paid to male workers and their families exceeded those paid to female
workers and their families. In 1970 the median income of women workers was about 45%
of men's, while the average benefit payments to women were 80% of the payments to men.
Also, because most families today have two wage-earners (63% in 1971), and since the
majority of workers earn less than the maximum amount upon which the tax is based, the
tax falls more heavily on the family with two wage-earners than on the family with one
earning the same amount. Whenever the wife in a two-parent working family is employed,
the family will be taxed more heavily than the one-parent working family or the unmarried
worker. The injustice of this system does not, however, rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. See Bell, Women and Social Security: Contributions and Benefits, (Paper
prepared for hearings of the Joint Economic Committee) (July 25, 1973); CrrzEN's
ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 67-78, 84-85; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 9, at
36-39; Note, Sex Classifications in the Social Security Benefit Structure, supra note 5, at
185-86 nn.23-26.
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e), (f)(l)(D), (f)(3) (1970). The widow of a deceased worker
receives the benefit regardless of dependency, while the widower of a deceased worker
may receive the benefit only if his working wife had paid three-fourths of the family's
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male workers are either denied entirely to the widowers, husbands,
husbands with children, and divorced husbands of female workers or
are provided only upon proof of the male spouses' dependency. Such
schemes, extending benefits to the "typical" family (male-
breadwinner, female-homemaker) but denying them when the sex roles
are reversed, have been described as "double-edged" discrimination: 91
they treat both the female worker and her husband differently from the
male worker and his wife. 92
expenses. The benefit is equal to the worker's PIA. As of December 1971, only 12,000
husbands and widowers received benefits based on their wives' earnings, while seven
million wives and widows received benefits based on their husbands'.
The benefits for dependent wives and widows, 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(1)(E), 402(b)(2),
402(e)(2) (1970), are a continuing source of irritation to working women. If both the
husband and wife are retired, the wife receives a benefit equal to one-half of the husband's
PIA, unless she is herself entitled to a worker's benefit which would be greater, in which
case she receives the latter amount. A widow receives a benefit equal to the full amount of
her husband's PIA unless she is entitled to a larger benefit as a worker. Thus, the married
or widowed woman who has worked most or all of her life may receive little more in
benefits than she would have received if she had never worked at all. As long as she could
have received a benefit merely for staying at home, the social security taxes she paid bring
her something less than their full return. Of the six million retired working women
receiving benefits in 1971, one million received the larger dependency benefits, and thus,
realized no return at all on their taxes. An equitable solution would be to allow credits
under the social security system for work performed in the home; benefits to all
individuals would then be based upon their work. Bell, supra note 86. See Clark v.
Celebrezze, 230 F. Supp. 798 (D. Mass. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), 402(c)(1)(C), 402(3) (1970). Wives of male workers entitled to
old age or disability benefits are entitled to a benefit equal to one-half of the worker's PIA.
Husbands of female workers are entitled to the benefit only if they meet the dependency
requirement. See note 87 supra and notes 110-11 and accompanying text infra.
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(1)(B), 402(d) (1970). The wife of a retired or disabled worker,
who has in her care a child eligible for a benefit, is herself entitled to a benefit equal to
one-half her husband's PIA. A surviving divorced wife of a worker, who has in her care a
child eligible for a benefit, is also entitled to a "mother's" benefit. Id. §§ 402(d), 402(g)(1).
Husbands of retired or disabled female workers and divorced husbands are not entitled to
a "father's" benefit. However, the "mother's" benefit for widows (id. § 402(g)) must now
be given to widowers.
90. Id. §§ 402(b)(1), 402(e)(1), 416(d). A divorced wife who has reached the age of 62, a
surviving divorced wife who does not care for a child but has reached the age of 62, and a
disabled surviving divorced wife between the ages of 50 and 60 are all entitled to benefits,
while males in the same circumstances are not. Both divorced wives and surviving
divorced wives must not have remarried and must have been married to the worker for
twenty years in order to qualify for the benefits. The purpose of the benefit for divorced
wives is to "provide protection mainly for women who have spent their lives in marriages
that are dissolved when they are far along in years--especially housewives who have not
been able to work and earn social security benefit protection of their own." H.R. REP. No.
213, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 94 (1965). Husbands are presumed not to stay at home to care for
the house and are not permitted to rebut this presumption.
91. Jablon v. Secretary of HEW, 399 F. Supp. 118, 123 (D. Md. 1975).
92. Employee fringe benefits are analogous in many respects to Social Security
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In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld93 the Supreme Court invalidated just
such a provision granting an allowance to the widows-with-children of
male workers but not to the widowers-with-children of female work-
ers.94 This provision, stated the Court, "deprive[s] women of protection
for their families which men receive as a result of their employment."
95
While noting a basic similarity to the statute struck down in Frontiero,
96
the Court found the statute here "more pemicious," 97 first, because it
did not even permit the dependent widower to obtain benefits, and
second, because the female worker contributed earnings on the same
benefits. Discrimination in the fringe benefits provided to male and female employees is
prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970), the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970), and Executive Order No. 11,246, 3
C.F.R. 169 (1974). Title VII provides for injunctive and affirmative relief, including hiring
and reinstatement awards, back pay, and attorney's fees to the prevailing party. The Equal
Pay Act overlaps Title VII and extends protection to additional private employees and
most government employees. The Act provides for recovery of back wages, underpay-
ment of wages, and attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs. Executive Order 11,246
prohibits discrimination by private employers contracting with the federal government.
Private suits by employees are not authorized; remedial action is limited to sanctions and
penalties imposed against the employer on the authority of the Secretary of Labor. The
fourteenth amendment would also provide some limited protection against discrimination
in fringe benefits if state action can be found. Under most private retirement plans, when
men and women are entitled to the same benefit, women receive a lower monthly benefit
because of their longer life expectancy. This result is permitted under the guidelines for
the Equal Pay Act and the Executive Order, but not under the guidelines for Title VII.
Unequal pension payments would probably pass the rational relationship test of the
fourteenth amendment. Employee death benefits and life insurance are not covered by the
Equal Pay Act and the Executive Order, but they are covered by Title VII, under which
they must be provided equally to the spouses of male and female employees. The
insurance industry uses different actuarial tables for men and women in determining
premium payments and pension benefits. Title VII, while it requires equal benefits for
male and female employees, would seem to forbid employers from paying a higher
premium to an insurance company in order to obtain the same monthly pension for the
female employee as for the similarly situated male employee. The situation is troublesome
and confusing to employers. See Haneberg, The EEOC and Employee Benefit Plans, I ll
TRusTs & ESTATES 726 (1972); Note, Sex Discrimination in Employee Fringe Benefits, 17
WM. & MARY L. REV. 109 (1975).
93. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970). "Section 402(g) was added to the Social Security Act in
1939 as one of a large number of amendments designed to 'afford more adequate
protection to the family as a unit.' " H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1939).
Monthly benefits were provided to wives, children, widows, orphans, and surviving
dependent parents of covered workers. Id. Children of covered women workers, how-
ever, were "eligible for survivors' benefits only in limited circumstances . . . and no
benefits whatever were made available to husbands or widowers on the basis of their
wives' covered employment." 420 U.S. at 643. See also id. at 639 n.5, 644 n.12.
95. 420 U.S. at 645.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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basis as the male worker to a fund from which she did not receive the
same benefits. 98 The Court rejected the government's argument, essen-
tially the same one it had accepted in Kahn,99 that the statute was
"reasonably designed to offset the adverse economic situation of
women by providing a widow with financial assistance to supplement or
substitute for her own efforts in the marketplace." 10 The scheme itself
and its legislative history convinced the Court that its purpose was not to
remedy past job discrimination against women, but instead, to allow
women to choose not to work and to remain at home with their
children.' 01 Thus the Court did not consider whether or not the different
treatment of the sexes was "reasonably designed to offset the adverse
economic situation of women." Of course, it was not: to grant this
benefit to the spouse of the male worker but deny it to the spouse of the
female worker obviously makes the female worker's efforts in the
marketplace worth less than the male worker's. As to the real purpose of
the statute, the parental care of children, the differing treatment of the
sexes was also "entirely irrational": 10 2 it discriminated among children
solely on the basis of the sex of the surviving parent, denying parental
98. Id.
99. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
100. 420 U.S. at 646. The Court also rejected the government's argument that social
security benefits are not compensation for work done and therefore that Congress is not
obliged to provide them equally to covered males and females. "From the outset, social
security old age, disability, and survivors' (OASDI) benefits have been 'afforded as a
matter of right, related to past participation in the productive processes of the country.'"
Id. at 646-647.
101. Id. at 648-49. Sex-based classifications which favor women must be premised
upon "special disadvantages of women" in order to satisfy equal protection. Since this
provision is premised upon providing to women the choice of whether to work or to care
personally for their children, it does not satisfy equal protection. Id.
See ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 5, at 30:
The Council believes that it is unnecessary to offer the same choice [whether to
work or to care for children] to a man. Even though many more married women work
today than in the past, so that they are both workers and homemakers, very few men
adopt such a dual role; the customary and predominant role of the father is not that of
a homemaker but rather that of the family breadwinner. A man generally continues to
work to support himself and his children after the death or disability of his wife. The
Council therefore does not recommend that benefits be provided for a young father
who has children in his care.
The recommendations of the Council as to which sex-based classifications should be
retained were followed by Congress in the 1972 amendments of the Social Security Act.
420 U.S. at 652-53 n.20.
To this reasoning of the Council, the Court replied: "The fact that a man is working
while there is a wife at home does not mean that he would, or should be required to,
continue to work if his wife dies. It is no less important for a child to be cared for by its sole
surviving parent when that parent is male rather than female." Id. at 651-52.
102. 420 U.S. at 651.
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care to those with a surviving father while permitting it to those with a
surviving mother. And further, "a father, no less than a mother, has a
constitutionally protected right to the 'companionship, care, custody,
and management' " of his children. 10 3
The Wiesenfeld opinion, while it roundly condemned the govern-
ment's rationale for the different treatment, was noticeably bare of any
discussion of standards. This silence is all the more remarkable in view
of the concern for standards expressed in Frontiero, which was so
similar in its issues and so close in time. Moreover, the Court was once
again fairly well united; the two brief'concurring opinions were in basic
agreement with the majority.'10 The Court, almost consciously, seemed
to give up the search for clear, definitive standards for the sake of
consensus. But the Court did not altogether cover its tracks here. Its
concern for the real purpose of the statute and its rejection of the
economic purpose proffered by the government went well beyond the
requirements of the rational relationship test, under which the courts
have traditionally presumed the validity of a challenged classification
and accepted any reason or state of facts, even if the reviewing court
itself had to invent them, which would conceivably justify the classifica-
tion.105 Clearly, the Court cast a burden of justifying the classification
upon the government and analyzed the classification under a test
somewhere between rational relationship and strict scrutiny. And just
as clearly, this approach was unnecessary, for the classification could
not pass a minimal rational relationship analysis as a remedy for prior
economic discrimination against women. A statutory scheme which
provides benefits to economically dependent women in order to remedy
prior economic discrimination and which at the same time punishes
them for becoming economically independent by denying them benefits
for their families provided to similarly situated men is inherently irra-
tional. As will always be the case with double-edged discrimination,
whatever economic reason is adduced to justify benefits for the family
which has adopted the traditional sex roles must inevitably fail when
applied to the family which has adopted the reverse sex roles and has set
about on its own to remedy the very evil addressed by the statute-the
imbalance of the sexes in the marketplace and the home.
Wiesenfeld focused only on the discrimination against the female
worker and her widower husband with children, who were absolutely
103, Id. at 652.
104. Id. at 654 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
105, See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
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denied benefits granted in the reverse sex-role situation. It does not
affect other sections of the Social Security Act which are parallel and
discriminate in exactly the same manner. 16 Successful challenges have
also been made upon some of the sections of the Act which do grant
benefits to the female worker and her husband, but only upon proof of
the latter's dependency. This distribution scheme is precisely parallel to
the one struck down in Frontiero. It imposes a double burden on the
female worker and her spouse relative to the male worker and his
spouse: first, the procedural burden of proof of dependency, and
second, the substantive burden of lower benefits when the husband is
not actually dependent for more than one-half of his support. 107 This is
the scheme for distributing benefits to the spouses of elderly or disabled
workers and to the widows and widowers of deceased workers. 0 8 (The
latter benefits are independent of those at issue in Wiesenfeld, which
involved an additional benefit to the widow of the deceased male worker
who has in her care children eligible for benefits.) 1' 9 Four district courts
have found the different treatment in the distribution of benefits to the
spouses of elderly or disabled workers to deny equal protection." 10 The
different treatment of widows and widowers has met the same fate."H
B. Social Security Retirement Benefits
Currently, retirement benefits for both male and female workers are
based upon average yearly earnings over the same number of years.112
Prior to December 1974, however, the benefits for female workers were
computed upon three fewer years than were the benefits for male
workers." 3 The effect of this provision was to eliminate the female
worker's three years of lowest earnings and thereby increase her
average monthly wage. Thus, a female worker with the same average
yearly earnings as a male worker received a larger retirement benefit
106. See notes 87-90 and accompanying text supra.
107. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 (1973).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C) (1970).
109. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
110. Jablon v. Secretary of HEW, 399 F. Supp. 118 (D. Md. 1975); Silbowitz v.
Secretary of HEW, 397 F. Supp. 862 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Goldfarb v. Secretary of HEW, 396
F. Supp. 308 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Coffin v. Secretary of HEW, 400 F. Supp. 953 (D.D.C.
1975).
111. Coffin v. Secretary of HEW, 400 F. Supp. 953 (D.D.C. 1975); Goldfarb v.
Secretary of HEW, 396 F. Supp. 308 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
113. Id. §§ 415(b)(2)(A)-3(A) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3) (Supp. IV,
1974).
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than the male. 114 This method of computation continues to apply to
workers who reached the age of 62 before December 1974. It has been
challenged several times. Initially, it was upheld on a rational basis
analysis"15 affected with "romantic paternalism.' 116 Later cases have
upheld the different treatment, also upon a rational basis analysis, but
for added measure have found the purpose of remedying past economic
discrimination against women "a compelling governmental interest." 17
These cases, that is, would have passed the statute under the strict
scrutiny test. A still later case upheld the statute solely upon the rational
basis test, convinced that this is the proper standard." 8
This method of computation presumes that all women entitled to
benefits have been discriminated against either in pay or in opportunity
during the three years of their lowest earnings. Of course not all women
have suffered such discrimination, and of those who have, some have
suffered it for more and some for less than three years; some, no doubt,
have suffered it only in years of higher earnings. The statute, therefore,
advantages all female workers without regard to the discrimination
actually suffered; those who have suffered none receive a windfall.
Reed and Frontiero, however, forbid different treatment of the sexes
merely for the sake of administrative convenience.119 Kahn, on the
114. See Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591,592 (2d Cir. 1968); Polelle v. Secretary
of HEW, 386 F. Supp. 443,444-45 (N.D. Ill. 1974). In spite of this favorabletreatment for
females, as of December 1972, the average monthly retirement benefit for males was
$179.60 and for females, $140.50. Id. at 444. Originally, both men and women became
eligibile for benefits at age 65. In 1956, women became eligible for benefits at age 62 (at a
reduced monthly rate), and the computation period was shortened three years. In 1961,
men, too, became eligible for the early, reduced benefits at age 62, but the computation
period was not shortened. For men who retired between the ages of 62 and 65, each of the
years of retirement was considered a year of low earnings in computing the average
monthly wage. This differential treatment, in addition to providing proportionately larger
benefits for women with the same earnings records as men, encouraged women, and
discouraged men, to retire at the earlier age. In June 1962,61.2% of retired female workers
and 40% of retired male workers received the reduced early retirement benefits. The
differential was phased out one year at a time between 1973 and 1975. See Note, Sex
Classifications in the Social Security Benefit Structure, supra note 5, at 182-84.
115. Polelle v. Secretary of HEW, 386 F. Supp. 443, 445 (N.D. Ill. 1974). See also
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684, 689 n.22 (1973).
116. There is here a reasonable relationship between the objective sought by the
classification, which is to reduce the disparity between the economic and physical
capabilities of a man and a woman--and the means used to achieve that objec-
tive. . . . [Variation in amounts of retirement benefits based upon differences in the
attributes of men and women is constitutionally valid.
Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1968) (emphasis added).
117. Polelle v. Secretary of HEW, 386 F. Supp. 443, 445-46 (N.D. I1. 1974).
118. Kohr v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
119. See notes 23, 24 & 37 and accompanying text supra.
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other hand, would seem to permit it when "fairly and substantially"
designed to remedy the effect of prior economic discrimination against
women. 120 The presumption here, however, that all female workers
have suffered job discrimination in the three years of lowest earnings,
has been seen not as administrative convenience, but as administrative
necessity: it would be administratively impossible to determine for each
year of each woman's employment how much earnings she had actually
lost through discrimination. 2 1 The presumption is thus said to bear a
reasonable relationship to the remedial purpose of the statute. 122 At this
point it might well be asked why Congress has given over this remedy by
equalizing the retirement benefits for male and female workers. The
answer suggested'23 is that the remedy is no longer necessary after ten
years of the Equal Pay Act and of Equal Employment Opportunity
under the Civil Rights Acts.'24 But the simple fact of the matter is that
the economic position of women workers has remained virtually
unchanged over the last ten years. 15
C. Aid to Families with Dependent Children
AFDC is a joint federal-state effort which provides benefits to
families on behalf of "needy children.' ' 26 The state develops its own
120. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
121. Polelle v. Secretary of HEW, 386 F. Supp. 443, 446 (N.D. I11. 1974).
122. Id. at 446-47.
123. Id. at 445; Kohr v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 1299, 1305 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
124. See notes 67, 92 supra. Another answer might be that Congress, having prohibited
different treatment of male and female employees in the pension programs of private
employers under Title VII and EEOC guidelinei, might have found it somewhat inconsis-
tent to allow such treatment in the Social Security Act by the federal government.
125. Data published by the Bureau of Census show that the economic position of
women relative to men for the years 1963-1972 actually worsened. Seetable, note 86 supra.
Relying on the same source, the Court, in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 354 n.6 (1974),
pointed out:
[I]n 1972 the median income of women with four years of college was $8,736--exactly
$100 more than the median income of men who had never even completed one year of
high school. Of those employed as managers or administrators, the women's median
income was only 53.2% of the men's, and in the professional and technical occupa-
tions the figure was 67.5%. Thus the disparity extends even to women occupying jobs
usually thought of as well paid.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970). Some remarkable instances of different treatment of the
sexes have occurred in state AFDC programs. Several states have sought to deny or reduce
benefits to children who lived with their mothers and with unrelated adult males. The most
notorious of these "man-in-the-house" provisions was Alabama's, which denied benefits
to the child when an "able-bodied man, married or single" (1) "lives in the home with the
child's natural or adoptive mother for the purpose of cohabitation," (2) "visits [the home]
frequently for the purpose of cohabiting with the child's natural or adoptive mother," or
(3) "does not frequent the home but cohabits with the child's natural or adoptive mother
elsewhere." Alabama Manual for Administration of Public Assistance, pt. I, c. II, § VI.
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plan of benefits, which must conform to federal statutes; 7 both state
and federal governments provide the funds. 128 Until 1961, the federal
statutes recognized three situations qualifying a family for AFDC
benefits: the death of a parent, the continued absence of a parent from
the home, and the mental or physical incapacity of a parent. 29 In 1961,
Congress provided further that the state could, at its option, grant
benefits for the unemployment of a parent.' 30 This addition, however,
was intended to assist only families with unemployed fathers, 131 and in
1967 the statute was specifically limited to such families. 3 2 Thus, where
the mother earns less than a subsistence income and the father is
unemployed, the family may receive benefits, but where the father
earns less than a subsistence income and the mother is unemployed, the
family may not receive benefits.'33 In short, mothers are presumed not
to provide substantial support to the family. To date, two such state
programs have withstood challenges, but neither challenge was based
squarely upon equal protection grounds.
34
State administrators differed as to the frequency of the mother's sexual relations which
would result in disqualification, opinions ranging from once a week to once in six months.
The Supreme Court struck down the statute in an opinion based narrowly upon the
construction and purpose of the federal statute establishing the program (42 U.S.C. §
606(a) (1970)). King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316-27 (1968). Thereafter, such state
regulations were directly forbidden by federal regulation. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1975). See
also VanLare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
Current federal statutes (42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17)(A)(2) (1970)) require state plans for
AFDC to provide that as a condition for aid recipients cooperate with the state in
establishing the paternity of illegitimate children and in obtaining support payments for
such children. The recipient's failure to cooperate results in protective payments for the
child. Several states have attempted to go further, to make such cooperation a condition of
aid, or even to impose prison sentences and fines for non-cooperation. The Supreme Court
has resisted these severe state sanctions for failure to comply with the federal statute. See
Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975); Lascaris v. Shirley, 420 U.S. 730 (1975); Note,
Developments in Welfare Law: AFDC ShelterReductions, 10 URBAN L. ANN. 213 (1975).
Related to AFDC is a program to provide employment incentives, opportunities, and
training to the members of families receiving AFDC benefits. As written, the federal
statutes required that "priority be given to such individuals in the following order...
first, unemployed fathers; second, mothers . . . who volunteer .... " 42 U.S.C. §
633(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). The statute was held to violate equal protection. Thorn v.
Richardson, 4 EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE DECISIONs 7,630 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 10, 1971).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1970).
128. Id. §§ 635, 643.
129. Id. § 606(a).
130. Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 1, 75 Stat. 75.
131. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 2997 (1967); seeBurrv. Smith, 322F. Supp. 980,
983 n.4 (W.D. Wash. 1971), aff'd, 404 U.S. 1227 (1972).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1970), formerly Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 1, 75 Stat. 75 (1961).
133. See note 143 and accompanying text infra.
134. Burr v. Smith, 322 F. Supp. 980 (W.D. Wash. 1971), aff'd, 404 U.S. 1227 (1972);
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III. FUTURE ATTACKS UPON SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION
IN WELFARE LEGISLATION
Frontiero and Wiesenfeld are the major authorities for challenging the
distribution schemes of the family benefits provisions of the Social
Security Act. 135 Presumably, they will be fatal to discrimination of the
"double-edged" type. Kahn, however, stands as an important qualifi-
cation: it may permit discrimination in favor of women which is, or
seems, fairly designed to remedy the effects of prior negative discrimi-
nation. It is essential, therefore, in attacking double-edged schemes to
stress the double harm, to both men and women, resulting from the
sex-role presumption. Such schemes cannot survive the rational rela-
tionship test (or if in fact there is one, an "intermediate" test) because
they are inherently irrational: they benefit some individuals and punish
or inhibit others merely because they are members of the same sex. 136
Where divorce is not a requirement for the family benefit, 137 the
differing treatment of male and female workers and their spouses is
eminently vulnerable. Where divorce is a requirement,138 the attack may
fail if the female worker is found to have little or no interest in obtaining
benefits for her divorced husband. The benefits provided to the
divorced wife of the male worker could be defended, however, as an
attempt to remedy past economic discrimination against women. 139 The
Graham v. Shaffer, 17 Ariz. 497, 498 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1972). In both cases a father
sought AFDC benefits and was denied. It is possible for a father to obtain AFDC in order
to remain at home with his children; in 1971, 1% of AFDC children had a father and no
mother present in their homes. B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON, S. Ross, SEx
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 769 (1975).
135. To obtain judicial review of a claim for old age, survivors, or disability insurance,
the claimant must follow the procedure set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970), which
requires (1) a final decision of the Secretary after a hearing unless the Secretary
determines a hearing to be useless; (2) "commencement [of a civil action] within 60 days
after the mailing . . . of notice of such decision or within such further time as the
Secretary may allow"; and (3) filing of the action "in the district court of the United
States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides, or has his principal place of
business." See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749,763-65 (1975). Such a claim may not be
raised on the federal jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), even though the claim
involves constitutional issues. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h); Weinberger v. Salfi, supraat 760-61. No
class claim is permissible unless all claimants have satisfied the requirements of § 405(g).
Id. Wiesenfeld proceeded under § 1331, but the government did not challenge the Court's
jurisdiction under this statute. 420 U.S. at 641-42 nn.8 & 10.
136. Where the sex-role presumption is irrebutable, it may also deny due process. See
note 82 supra.
137. See notes 87-89 and accompanying text supra.
138. See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
139. For Congress's purpose in providing benefits to divorced spouses see note 90
supra.
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divorce, in other words, changes the double-edged discrimination into
remedial discrimination; the real cutting edge, the discrimination against
the female worker, has been lost. Of course it should be argued that the
female worker does have an interest in obtaining benefits for a divorced
spouse, especially if she is liable, under statute or divorce decree, for
any portion of his support.
Benefits provided to the divorced female spouse because a child in
her care is eligible for benefits are even more problematic. Wiesenfeld
insisted that comparable benefits to widows on behalf of their children
were intended, not to remedy past economic discrimination against
women, but to allow them to remain at home and care for their
children. 140 But even though benefits provided to divorced female
spouses on behalf of children were similarly intended to permit them to
remain at home, the Supreme Court could conceivably approve the
remedial argument where divorce removes the female worker's claim of
discrimination as to spousal benefits. In other words, the Court might
decide that divorced male and female spouses, like widows and widow-
ers, have equal rights to remain at home caring for children, and further,
that the children have equal rights to the personal care of the custodial
parent. Or the Court might decide that benefits provided only to
divorced female spouses are remedial and do not treat the female
worker differently from the male worker since neither has an interest in
obtaining benefits for a divorced spouse. But here, too, it should be
argued that male and female workers have an equal interest in obtaining
benefits for divorced spouses, especially where the spouses obtain
custody of the children and the workers are required to provide support
to the spouses or the children or both.
As to classifications directed solely against one sex or the other, the
outcome of any challenge will turn upon which sex is discriminated
against and for what purpose. The previous method of computing
retirement benefits, which continues to discriminate against men and in
favor of women who reached the age of 62 before December 1974, will no
doubt survive future attacks as an attempt to remedy prior economic
discrimination agaist women. 41 The AFDC-UP program, which seems
on its face to discriminate against women and in favor of men by
140. See notes 100-01 and accompanying text supra.
141. See notes 113-25 and accompanying text supra. Absence of employment oppor-
tunities for older women seems to have been a factor in reducing the retirement age of
women to 62 and in shortening the computation period. See Executive Hearings before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961); H.R. REP. No. 1189,84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1955).
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granting unemployment benefits only to fathers of needy children, 142
may be vulnerable from two directions. In some instances, the program
will function as a form of double-edged discrimination favoring some
families but not others with the same income depending on which parent
earns the income. The program discriminates in favor of the family in
which the mother earns less than a subsistence income and the father is
unemployed and against the family in which the father earns less than a
subsistence income and the mother is unemployed. The total income of
the former, but not the latter, will be increased by the amount of the
benefit. The result is inherently irrational. The benefit structure also
discriminates among the children of these two hypothetical families
according to the sex of the parent who is employed (or unemployed) and
is therefore not rationally related to the purpose of the program-to
benefit these children. 143
In the attack upon sex-based classifications, much will depend on the
purposes of the classifications. To a large extent, the uncertainty
surrounding the rational relationship test results from the impossibility
of defining in the abstract what is or is not a rational purpose, the
standard seeming to shift as one purpose seems a little more or less
reasonable than another. The Supreme Court has become increasingly
wary of "face value assertions of legislative purposes." 144 It is impor-
tant, therefore, in attacking these classifications to argue not only the
discriminatory effect of the classification but also the discriminatory
purpose of the legislature. The Court, as it did in Wiesenfeld, may cast
upon the government the burden of adducing a valid purpose for the
classification. Some purposes, whether actual or hypothetical, will not
satisfy the Court. Administrative convenience-the reduction of cost
and effort-will not. Nor is the Court likely to accept a classification
directed against one sex or the other founded only upon the unexamined
presumption that men are more adept in the marketplace and women
more adept in the home. The Court does, however, seem inclined to
permit different treatment of the sexes designed to remedy past
economic discrimination against women. Administrative necessity-
the overwhelming task of making a very large number of complicated
142. See notes 126-34 and accompanying text supra.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1970).
144. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975). See also Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 633-34 (1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1973); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Gunther, supra note 26,
at 19.
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determinations-may also persuade the Court to uphold a classification
designed to benefit women economically. Finally, the Court may accept
the substantive cost of a benefit, as distinguished from the cost of
determining those entitled to it, as a rational basis for different treat-
ment of the sexes, especially where the classification is in any way
susceptible to characterization on a basis other than sex.
CONCLUSION
Much welfare legislation in this country, especially the family
benefits provisions of the Social Security Act, presumes the stereotypic
family structure of male breadwinner and female homemaker. A sig-
nificant and increasing number of people, both men and women, do not
conform to these stereotypes and are deprived of valuable benefits for
no other reason than their sex. Many others who do or expect to receive
benefits are no doubt inhibited from changing their roles for fear of
losing them. Recent court decisions show that some of these provisions
are ready to fall to the first equal protection challenge. The controversy
over the proper standard to apply in such cases seems resolved, for the
time being, in favor of the rational relationship test or its unacknow-
ledged, intermediate offspring. Future controversies are likely to focus
on the purpose and effect of such provisions. The proper solution to the
inequities of welfare law, however, lies with legislatures rather than
courts. The proper solution will begin with a new Social Security Act
which not only eliminates different treatment of the sexes but also
discards the regressive method of contribution, 45 closes gaps in cover-
age, 4 and takes account of work in the home as well as in the
marketplace. 147
145. See note 86 supra.
146. For example, a divorced wife cannot receive benefits unless she was married to
the worker for 20 years (42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), 416(d)(1) (1970)); a widow cannot receive
benefits until she reaches the age of 60, unless sheis caring for a child under 18 years (id. §§
402(e), 416(c)); a disabled widow cannot receive benefits until she is 50 years old (id. §§
402(e), 423).
147, See Bell, supra note 86.
1976]
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol12/iss1/6
